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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~CLARENCE B. LAMBERT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRRY SINE and DORA SINE, 
doing business under the name and 
style of Se Rancho Motor Lodge 
and Tourist Apartments, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 7572 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The statement of facts in the appellants' brief 
appears accurate. The record indicates, however, that 
each side viewed much of the evidence differently, that 
the statements of certain witnesses were diametrically 
opposed. This conflict in the testimony is not de-
veloped in the appellants' statement of the facts, but 
instead, the court is led to believe that certain testi-
mony tending to bolster appellants' theories of the 
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case is clear and uncontroverted. For this reason, 
and because respondent desires to correct what he 
considers some erroneous statements, he restates many 
of the facts. 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Clarence B. Lambert, born in Utah and a resident 
of Salt Lake City, is the respondent. On the 2d of 
January, 1950, the respondent, accompanied by his 
brother, Charles Lambert, and a mutual friend, Donald 
E. Moore, were looking for a place to live (R. 5, 7, 
28, 41). Both Clarence Lambert and his brother, 
~Charles, had been living in their mother's house in 
Salt Lake City. Charles Lambert was unemployed. 
The respondent also was unemployed, going to work 
for a contractor, John Oliphant, in February, 1950 
(R. 53 and 59). Mr. Moore had been living with his 
brother in Salt Lake City, where he had been paying 
for his room and board (R. 38 and 43). At this 
time Mr. Moore was employed by the Denver & Rio 
Grande Railroad (R. 38). 
On the evening of January 2, 1950, the respondent, 
his brother, and Mr. Moore went to appellants' motor 
lodge on North Temple. Charles Lambert explained 
that the Se Rancho Motor Lodge and Tourist Apart-
ments were selected for the reason that it was close 
to where Mr. Moore was employed (R. 15). Mrs. 
Sine, one of the appellants and joint owner with her 
husband of the motor lodge was on duty (R. 51). 
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Mrs. Sine asked the group several questions. She 
wanted to know where they were from and how long 
they intended to stay at her motor lodge (R. 16). 
Mrs. Sine told the group that she did not want to 
rent one of her apartments to them if they were 
just going to stay for a short length of time (R. 17, 
45 and 51). It was decided that the respondent, his 
brother, and Mr. Moore would occupy Apartment 107. 
The conversation was concluded after a discussion as 
to what the rent of 107 would be. On this subject, 
the testimony is in conflict. At the trial no one re-
membered with any degree of certainty just what was 
decided (R. 34, 4·6 and 101). In any event, neither 
the Lamberts nor Mr. Moore had any money that 
evening, and before moving into the apartment, Mrs. 
Sine took a suit from Charles Lambert as security 
(R. 17, 36 and 101). 
The appellants' description of Apartment No. 107 
is essentially correct; however, the respondent can 
hardly agree with the statement that "the third roon1 
was a small kitchen or kitchenette", when it consisted 
of a stove, ice box, chairs and table, and eontained 
sufficient space for eating (R. 18 and 81). 
In their statement of facts, the appellants assert 
that "some house cleaning service was performed". 
On this point the evidence is again clearly in conflict. 
Charles Lambert testified that he, his brother and 
Mr. Moore kept the apartment clean and made the 
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·beds ( R. 19 and 20). On the other hand, Mrs. Sine 
testified that she had at one time scrubbed the floor 
of the respondent's apartment (R. 103). 
On March 15, 1950, at approximately 7:30p.m., the 
respondent discovered that he was locked out of his 
apartment. He was informed by Mrs. Sine that he 
was locked out for past due rent and was told that 
he owed a sum of about $73.00 (R. 54-55 and 110). 
The respondent felt that this amount was excessive. 
Mrs. Sine declined to discuss the matter further, tell-
·ing the reS'pondent that her husband had retired and 
could not be disturbed (R. 54 and 108). The respond-
ent left and went to a hotel (R. 55). Later that same 
evening, the respondent called a friend, Walter A .. 
Stroud, and Mr. Stroud met the respondent at the 
motor lodge where he talked with Mrs. Sine (R. 55 
and 68). Mrs. Sine again repeated that the amount 
owing by the respondent was in excess of $70.00 (R. 
69). The respondent spent the night of March 15th 
at the hotel, and the next day moved into his mother's 
house, where because of the crowded conditions he 
slept on the floor (R. 58). 
Later that same week the respondent made an 
offer to pay Mrs. Sine an amount between $50.00 and 
$60.00. This was refused (R. 65). On the 16th, the 
respondent returned to the motor lodge early in the 
morning and was allowed to get some working clothes 
(R. 57 and 108). The remainder of the appellants' 
statement of facts appears correct, with the exception 
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of the erroneous assertion that no amount was awarded 
as actual damages. And further, that the court held 
that appellants had a lien on the personal property 
of the respondent for the unpaid charges. The 
court discusses the problem of the lien but says : ''As 
to that particular point, I am not going to decide 
it" (R. 126). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE RELATION OF THE 
APPELLANTS TO THE RESPONDENT WAS THAT OF 
LANDLORD AND TENANT SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
There is no argument that ordinarily an establish-
ment like the Se Rancho Motor Lodge and Tourist 
Apartments, which is usually referred to by the pub-
lic as a motor lodge, motel, or motor court, caters 
principally to transients and travellers who prefer 
their automobile to other modes of transportation, and 
who enjoy motels to the more formal atmosphere of 
the standard hotel. However, it is the respondent's 
theory that what these appellants ordinarily do cannot 
be used to screen other activities or to hide the fact 
that these appellants do at times, and in fact did in 
this instance, use their establishment to create a rela-
tionship different from that created with a traveller. 
In Cedar Rapids Investment Company v. Commo-
dore Hotel Company (Iowa, 1928), 218 NW 510, 56 
A.L.R. 1098, 145 A.L.R. 363, the court said : 
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''The same building may undoubtedly be 
operated as an inn and rooming house, eating 
house, and apartment house as a single institu-
tion and under the same management. Such 
operation, however, would not make the rela-
tionship between proprietor and all of the occu-
pants of the house of the one class either 
guests, roomers or tenants. The defendants 
relationship with some of them might be that 
of innkeeper and guest, and with others land-
lords and tenants.'' 
The first problem then that faces us is to deter-
mine whether the trial court's finding that the rela-
tionship between these appellants and the res·pondent 
was that of landlord and tenant is correct (R. 8). In 
considering this point, the California court in Roberts 
v. Casey, 37 Cal. App. (2d Supp.) 767, 93 P(2) 654, 
at page 658, says : 
''Though we treat the question, however, not 
as one of fact merely but as one of mixed law 
and fact, it is still clear that an appellate tri-
bunal is only justified in overruling the view 
taken by a trial court if the factors that enter 
into the relation, and mark it as of the char-
acter opposite to that found by the lower 
Court, so dominate the situation as to clearly 
nullify the effect of the factors opposed to 
them. Otherwise the question is to be dete!'-
mined as one of fact as to which the judgment 
of the trial Court must be treated as conclud-
ing the matter." 
It appears to the respondent that the trial court's 
finding of fact No. 4 is clearly borne out by the 
1]1 
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record. Let us follow events chronologically. The 
first incident was the meeting on the evening of 
January 2, 1950, between the Lamberts and Mr. Moore 
with ~Irs. Sine in the office of the Se Rancho Motor 
Lodge and Tourist Apartments. At this time appar-
ently a rather lengthy conversation took place. Tliree 
points were discussed: 
1. The type of unit that was to be engaged (R. 
16 and 51). 
2. The length of time said unit was to be occu-
pied (R. 16, 45 and 51). 
3. The amount of money it was to cost and how 
frequently it was to be ·paid (R. 18, 34, 45, 46 and 51). 
Each of these three points is of interest. In this 
conversation we have the first sign of what type of 
relationship was contemplated. What type of accom-
modations were the Lamberts and Mr. Moore looking 
for 1 1frs. Sine showed the group pictures of the 
type of units she had available. Most of them were 
rejected. They were looking for a place with a kitchen. 
They wanted to do their own cooking. That way it 
would be cheaper (R. 16 and 51). When M;rs. Sine 
showed them a ·picture of apartment 107, with a 
kitchen, they decided to take it. There would be few 
transients who would take such care at 7 :30 in the 
evening selecting a place to stay. These men were 
careful. They were not looking for just a place to 
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sleep, a cheap hole-in-the-wall where they could throw ;a 
their hats; they wanted more than that. They wanted 
a place they could call home for several months, per-
haps for longer. :~~ 
~J 
Second, how long were they going to stay T Mrs. ;:~ 
Sine made it quite clear that she had no intention t@ 
of renting to them unless they planned on remaining 1~ 
for some time (R. 17). Charles La~bert remembered 
''she did not want to rent the apartment to us just 
for a week or two weeks. She wanted to rent it to 
us for a period of time". He replied that they 
"intended on being there for a period of time" (R. 
51). Is this the way an innkeeper speaks to his guests T 
No! Mrs. Sine asked other questions (R. 16). Her 
intent is clear. This appellant who now cries for 
her innkeeper's lien, 52-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, was careful on that night in January, 1950, to 
make certain that she was not renting to transients, 
tourists or travellers. This is not the situation where 
the guest remains for a long period of time and then 
claims to be a tenant. New Southern Hotel Company 
v. Kingston (Ohio, 193'6), 72 NE(2) 782. 
In the instant case, the appellant, Dora Sine, 
insisted before she would consider renting to the re-
spondent, his brother and Mr. Moore that the three of 
them agree to stay :at her establishment for quite 
some period of time. Mrs. Sine wanted tenants, not 
guests. In their brief, the appellants put emphasis 
on Exhibit 1, which is a card entitled, "Guest Regis-
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tration ". This is a printed form. Its title has no 
application to the facts of this case. An examination 
of Exhibit 1 indicates that the respondent and his 
friends either did not own an automobile, or Mrs. 
Sine did not think it necessary under the circum-
stances to record information concerning one on the 
card. Appellant's attorney, in cross-examining Charles 
Lambert, made clear that this motor lodge was "de-
signed for easy access to the travelling public by 
motor vehicle". Here again, respondent points out 
that Mrs. Sine knew she was not nor did she want to 
deal in this instant case with members of the ''travel-
ling public". Exhibit 1 has another purpose besides 
the mere registering of persons staying at the motor 
lodge. Turn it over and look at the back. It now 
becomes apparent that Exhibit 1 is a ledger card 
used by these appellants for keeping record of · the 
charges and credits of occupants of the motor lodge. 
This fact and the conversation between Mrs. Sine 
and the respondent set out above nullify any signifi-
cance that might otherwise be attached to the printed 
title of Exhibit 1. 
The third and last topic discussed during that 
conversation on January 2d was the amount of money 
Mrs. Sine wanted for apartment 107 and how often 
it should be paid. The writer has already pointed 
out in his statement of facts that none of the witnesses 
for either side could remember with certainty just 
what was said on this point. In the court's finding of 
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fact No. 2 (R. 7), this conflict was resolved in favor 
of respondent. Respondent believes that this finding 
is sustained by the following facts : 
a. During the conversation, Mr. Moore remem-
bered telling Mrs. Sine that "I would have to pay 
her every two weeks, because that is when I receive 
my pay * * * the lOth and the 25th, and she agreed 
to that" (R. 45). 
h. Mrs. Sine remembered the boys ''would only 
be paid twice a month" (R. 102). 
c. Both Exhibit "A" and Exhibit 1 show that 
$42.00 was paid on the lOth and 25th of each month. 
These dates correspond with Mr. Moore's paydays. 
An examination of Exhibit "A" and Exhibit 1 
reveals that though no amount less than $42.00 was 
ever paid, some attempt by these appellants has been 
made to make it look as though the $42.00 was to 
be divided into weekly payments. This is no more 
than an artful plan to juggle the facts in order to 
demonstrate that the respondent was paying his rent 
on a weekly basis, and as such should be disregarded 
by the court. The respondent feels that the above 
facts indicate that he was not paying a weekly rental. 
However, the respondent is confident that should the 
court find that he was paying a weekly rental, such 
fact would still be a strong indication that the rela-
tionship of landlord and tenant existed. 
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In State v. Bowman (Minn., 1938), 279 NW 214, 
the court said: 
"It is difficult to see how any other deter-
mination could be reached. The record indicates 
that the agreement was based upon the payment 
of a weekly rental for the use and occupation 
of some part of defendant's premises.'' 
On petition for rehearing, the court said: 
"Whether the relation of landlord and ten-
ant existed was a fact question which the trial 
court resolved against the defendant.'' 
The rehearing was denied. In this case the de-
fendant owned and operated a building known as 
the Oriole Apartment Hotel. W. C. Keller rented a 
room and bath for himself and his wife. When they 
took possession the only furniture the Kellers pos-
sessed was a radio and radio table. The balance 
of the furniture necessary to get :along with was 
provided by defendant except as to a few additional 
articles later acquired by the Kellers. On December 
26, 1936, Keller owed in back rent $76.00, and defend-
ant, in Keller's absence, locked up the room and pre-
vented Keller from re-entering or removing their 
clothes and personal belongings unless they paid the 
back rental. 
In Murray v. Hagens (La., 1932), 143 So. 505, 
145 A.L.R. 365, ·plaintiffs were considered tenants by 
the court. Plaintiffs had rented two rooms in the 
wing of defendant's hotel at a specified amount per 
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week and that these rooms were used for light house-
keeping, and that no maid service was furnished in 
connection with them. 
Following the conversation in the office, the Lam-
berts and Mr. Moore moved into apartment 107. 
Charles Lambert in his testimony describes the con-
dition of the apartment that first night as being 
"pretty messy, the whole place" (R. 20). He further 
testified as to who cleaned the apartment, "We did" 
(R. 19). To the respondent this seems inconsistent 
with ,an innkeeper and guest relationship. On cros8-
examination Charles Lambert testified as follows: 
"Q. During the time that you were there, 
you obtained clean linens from the office week-
ly, did you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. .Some of the time, the motor court put 
the linens on your beds ~ 
A. No, we went down and got them. 
Q. Some of the time, didn't the motor 
court put the linens on your beds~ 
A. No, we went down and got them. 
Q. In every case~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. While you were there, the motor court 
cleaned your apartment several times~ 
A. No. 
Q. Didn't they~ 
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A. No. 
Q. If they did, you didn't notice it, is 
that it! 
A. I know they didn't because-
Q. Were you there all the time~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You never left the motor court' 
A. I was drawing unemployment and I 
was there during the day. I know what went 
on because I done it.'' 
In Murray v. Hagens, supra, the court pointed 
out in finding that a landlord and tenant relationship 
existed that these rooms were used for "light house-
keeping'', and that no maid service was furnished in 
connection with them. 
In Leon v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Company (Neb., 
1938), 134 Neb. 137, 277 NW 823, 145 A.L.R. 364, 
the court found that plaintiff was a guest, despite the 
fact that plaintiff had lived in the hotel two years. 
However, the court emphasized the fact that the only 
difference between plaintiff and other patrons of the 
defendant was the fact that he was charged and 
paid by the month, other\vise he was furnished the 
same services and accommodations as transient patrons. 
The next point to consider is the type of unit 
the respondent occupied. It was one of the largest 
units at the appellants' motor court (R. 113). It had 
a full-sized kitchen with a table that could be opened 
to allow the occupants to eat in the kitchen (R. 81). 
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There were also two bedrooms and a bath. Unlike the 
defendant in Vaughn v. Neal, cited by these appel-
lants at page 10 of their brief, this respondent occu- :;nr 
pied a self-contained unit exclusively for his own use. 
In Va;ughn v. Neal, the defendant had only a sleeping i l 
room. There was no private bath and no kitchen as jr 
such, the defendant using an alcove for cooking. ''1 
In this case, apartment 107 contained several 
basic pieces of furniture, adequate to supply the 
needs of the usual guest. However, while these men 
occupied the apartment, they found it necessary to 
make certain purchases (R. 33 and 34). On this point 
Donald Moore testified as follows : 
'' Q. Now, in connection with using this 
unit, did you purchase any items for use in the, 
in this apartment~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you the one that purchased those 
items~ 
A. Yes, I bought glasses and silverware 
and cups and saucers and dishes from the 
Cashis King, right there at the side of it." 
The respondent also testified that at one time 
he had a radio in the unit (R. 118). Such conduct 
strongly suggests a tenancy. The respondent agrees 
that the appellants furnished utilities, supplied garb-
age receptacle, and that employes of the motel pos-
sessed keys to their apartment. 
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In Fudge v. Downing (Utah, 1933), 83 U. 101, 
27 P(2) 33, the court found that the rel,ationship of 
landlord and tenant existed, the court finding in favor 
of the plaintiff. In that case, plaintiff was occupying 
a unit or apartment similar to the one here under 
discussion. It consisted of a living room, kitchen and 
private bath. It was furnished with linen, dishes, 
silverware, cooking utensils, frigidaire, and furniture 
for household keeping. The plaintiff moved into this 
apartment with only a radio, various articles of 
clothing, cooking utensils, bedding, etc. Though our 
Supreme Court does not mention utilities, garbage 
disposal, or maintenance work, the writer feels it is 
safe to comment that such items were ;properly fur-
nished in the Downing Apartments, and also that 
Bessie Downing had a passkey. 
The appellants in support of their case cite 
Noblit v. Blickshire, 93 Cal. App. (2) 864, 210 P(2) 
43. The respondent, after reading the case, is unable 
to see how it is applicable to the instant case. In 
the N oblit case, the court made no finding as to the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
but the court probably felt that the relationship be-
tween the parties was innkeeper and guest, and, such 
·being the case, the plaintiff had no cause of action. 
The appellants in their brief conclude that if under 
these circumstances a motel operator is a landlord, 
he is virtually without a remedy against an occupant 
who fails to pay his rent. This is not true, for as a 
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landlord he has recourse to 52-3-1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943. The motel operator as landlord is, for 
practical purposes, in the same position as the OpBr-
ator of a furnished apartment. The appellants herein 
are in the same position as the defendant in Fudge v. 
Downing, supra, where the court found a landlord and 
tenant relationship. 
This court must not become confused by the fact ,,, 
that appellants usually operate their establishment to J~ 
accommodate transients. The appellants would "like "1 
to have their cake and eat it, too". They want the :~~r 
privilege of renting units to persons who agree to Jlll 
remain for a long time, and who, while they remain ]~ 
at the motel, are making it their home, thus assuring 'Bt 
themselves of occupied units and a steady flow of ill 
rentals. The appellants want this advantage without 
losing any of the statutory protection reserved for 
the innkeeper, who is dealing with transients, trav-
ellers, and tourists. 
Appellants contend that as a practical matter 
104-60-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, requires that 
a weekly rental paid be not considered a landlord and 
tenant relationship. This statement is inconsistent with 
the appellants' previous statement found in the second 
full paragraph on page 13 of their brief. Nor do 
the appellants support this statement with any cases. 
A review of the cases cited by the appellants in their 
brief indicates that in no instance does any court 
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even suggest that a landlord and tenant relationship 
will depend alone on the length of time elapsing 
between rental periods. 
The appellants, at page 17 of their brief, state 
that the trial judge gave them the benefit of the inn-
keeper's lien. This is not so. The trial judge dis-
cussed this point, mused over it for a moment or 
two before realizing the inconsistency of such a hold-
ing with a landlord and tenant relationship and said: 
"At least I am going to say that, as to that 
particular point, I am not going to decide it" (R. 126). 
The intent of the parties, the facts in the record, and 
the law applicable to the circumstances reveal that 
there existed between the respondent and these appel-
lants the relationship of landlord and tenant. 
POINT II. 
WHERE THE WRONGFUL ACT CONSTITUTES AN 
INFRINGEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT, IT IS PROPER TO 
ALLOW DAMAGES FOR MENTAL ANGUISH AND HUMILI-
ATION, WHERE THEY ARE THE DIRECT, PROXIMATE 
AND NATURAL RESULTS OF THE WRONGFUL ACT. 
The appellants argue that it was error to award 
damages for mental anguish and humiliation where 
there was no wilful or malicious wrong and no award 
of actual damages. In discussing this point, they 
assume that the relation between the parties was that 
of landlord and tenant, and that the appellants wrong-
fully locked the respondent out of his motel unit. We 
do not here suggest that the mental suffering and 
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great embarrassment and humiliation caused this re-
spondent in themselves constitute a cause of action 
against the appellants. This controversy involves the 
right of the appellants to evict the respondent from 
his apartment and claim a lien on his personal prop-
erty. If the acts of the appellants were wrongful, as 
assumed by the appellants, then a cause of action 
exists in favor of the respondent, and courts have 
always considered mental suffering 'and humiliation, 
when the natural and proximate consequences of the 
act complained of, as an element of damages. 
A very clear statement of the rule applicable to 
a recovery for mental suffering and humiliation is iJi 
found in Larson v. Chase (Mii:m., 1891), 47 Minn. 307, 
50 NW 238, 14 L.R.A. 85. This case is quoted with ~~ 
approval in 23 A.L.R. 361, at 363, under the annota-
tion, ''Damages; right to recover for mental pain and 
anguish alone, apart from other damages''. Although ~~~ 
that action involved a wilful injury, the language 
used is applicable generally. It is as follows: ±1 
"There have been a great deal of Jlliscon-
ception and confusion as to when, if ever, men-
tal suffering, as a distinct element of damage, 
is a subject for compensation. This has fre-
quently resulted from the courts giving a wrong 
reason for a correct conclusion, that in a given 
case no recovery could be had for mental suffer-
ing, placing it on the ground that mental suffer-
ing, as a distinct element of damage, is never 
a proper subject of compensation, when the' 
correct ground was that the act complained of 
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was not an infraction of any legal right, and 
hence not an actionable wrong at all, or else 
that the mental suffering was not the direct 
and ·proximate effect of the wrongful act * * * 
Where the wrongful act constitutes an infringe-
ment on a legal right, mental suffering may be 
recovered for, if it is the direct, proximate, 
and natural result of the wrongful act * * * 
Wherever the act complained of constitutes a 
violation of some legal right of the plaintiff 
which always in contemplation of law cause 
injury, he is entitled to recover all damages 
which are the proximate and natural conse-
quences of the wrongful act''. 
Burford v. Crause (D.C., 1950), 89 Fed. Supp. 
818, is the first case cited by the appellants in support 
of this point. This is a case from the trial court of 
the District of Columbia. The plaintiff was suing for 
compensatory and punitive damages for an alleged 
unlawful eviction. The facts are that the defendant, 
after expiration of a lease, and with prior written 
notice of his intention to do so, as well as affording 
the plaintiff tenant several extensions, apparently to 
permit him time to remove his effects from the apart-
ment, broke a lock and reentered. The court held that 
the evidence did not amount to a showing of legal 
damages compensable under the law. Wrote Judge 
Kirkland: 
''To successfully maintain a suit under the 
theory of this complaint, the plaintiff must 
show an injury to a legal right and that dam-
ages flowed as a result". 
The verdict was directed for the defendant. 
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In Cochrane v. Tuttle, 75 Ill. 361, the court after 
considering the evidence was unable to determine 
exactly what the relationship of the parties was. A 
reading of the case indicates that the court felt that 
the plaintiff suffered no legal damage under any 
theory of the evidence, and for that reason the jury's 
verdict was considered entirely out of reason. 
These two cases cited by the appellants are the 
type recognized in the Larson case as giving a right 
conclusion for a wrong reason. 
In Toler v. Cassinelli (W.Va., 1946), 129 W.Va. 
591, 41 SE ( 2) 672, the court reversed the trial court 
and sent the case back for a new trial because of a 
failure of the jury to bring in a proper verdict. Said 
the court: 
''The finding actually made by the jury em-
braces only punitive damages * * * Plaintiff 
cannot maintain an action merely to recover 
punitive or exemplary damages", 
but this court does not deny that humiliation and 
mental pain may be considered as elements of damage, 
for the court said: 
"Where unreasonable and wilful action by 
the defendant inflicts indignity, humiliation and 
insult on the plaintiff, resulting in mental pain 
and suffering, they are a just basis for com-
pensatory damages''. 
Judge Kenna, who wrote a concurring opinion, stated 
the essence of this case when he said : 
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''The jury reported nothing and should have 
been sent back to its room for further delibera-
tion and further instructed, if necessary. It is 
my opinion that the judgment in this case had 
no verdict upon which to stand, and I would 
so treat it". 
Michels v. Boureta (Tex.), 122 SW(2) 216 in-
volves damages to a tombstone. No recovery was 
allowed in this case for mental pain and anguish, 
Texas being a jurisdiction which refuses to grant 
same in cases involving damages to tombstones or 
desecration of graveyards, where the defendant was 
negligent and had not acted wilfully. 
In the instant case, a legal right of respondent's 
was violated, and for this reason he is entitled to 
damages, the court allowing damages for mental pain 
and suffering as an element of general damages, since 
they were the direct, proximate and natural results 
of the wrongful act. 
POINT III. 
IT IS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT TO RE-OPEN THE CASE. 
The appellants in their argument, Point III, assert 
the court should not have re-opened the case at the 
conclusion of the evidence in chief, and should have 
granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The record 
(R. 124) shows that the court re-opened on its own 
motion for the purpose of inquiring into facts that 
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pose of the issues in the case. 
This is a well-recognized right of the trial judge, 
it being considered that he may re-open in the further-
ance of the interests of justice, even though the 
parties have restedr 
53 Am. J ur., page 109, Sec. 123. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS FAIR 
AND PROPER. 
The judgment (R. 10) allowed the plaintiff to 
recover against the defendants the sum of $250.00, and 
allowed the defendants a setoff on their counterclaim 
in the amount of $64.96, leaving a net money judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff of $185.04. The court found, 
in its finding No. 7 (R. 8), that the actions of the 
defendants were unlawful. The court further found, 
in its finding No. 8, that the defendants caused the 
plaintiff great mental anguish and suffering, and that 
he was greatly embarrass.ed. The record indicates 
that· the plaintiff was forced to find lodgings in a hotel 
at a late hour of the evening, when he was dressed 
only in a T shirt and Levi's and was not prepared 
to appear in public (R. 121). He was also forced to 
spend one night sleeping on the floor at his mother's 
home, and it was not until his mother had taken over 
that part of the house that she had been renting that 
he was again settled ( R. 58). 
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It appears to this writer that the trial court was 
rn a position to weigh these circumstances, and that 
the award of damages was small enough under the 
circumstances. 
The respondents, in their brief on pages 29 and 
30, refer to four cases to substantiate their point 
that the court's award of damages was excessive. An 
examination of these cases discloses that they failed 
to uphold the respondents' point of view. 
In Robinson v. Bonhaye (La., 1940), 195 So. 365, 
the defendant filed no answer and was not represented 
at the trial. The trial court gave a judgment for the 
defendant. In his reasons for judgment, the trial 
judge said: 
''The court, after hearing this matter and 
seeing the witnesses, is not in a position to fix 
the amount to be rendered, if any amount 
should be set''. 
On appeal the defendant and appellee was again un-
represented, but the appellate court did award damages. 
In Holmes v. DiLeo (La., 1938), 184 So. 35'6, the 
plaintiff alleged he was out of possession for 25 days 
and often had to sleep in a chair. In reducing a 
$250.00 judgment to $25.00, the appellate court said: 
''All in all, we think the circumstances most 
suspicious and we doubt whether an ejected 
tenant would have remained quiescent under the 
circumstances. It seems certain he would have 
vehemently protested his efforts to see him 
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until the matter might be adjusted. Neverthe-
less, we find it impossible to see that the finding 
of the court below was manifestly erroneous''. 
It appears that the lower court was upheld, but being 
suspicious of the whole action, and especially eyeing 
the plaintiff with suspicion, and perhaps agreeing with 
the defendant that the whole business was started by 
the plaintiff "in order to form the basis for a claim 
for damages", the appellate court reduced the damages. 
Respondents cite Rammell v. Bulen (Ohio, 1948), 
80 NE (2) 167, as an example of an appellate court 
returning a case for a new trial because of the exces-
sive damages. A reading of the case shows that this 
is not so. In this case a jury brought in a verdict 
for $1,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court, 
after denying a motion for a new trial, did sustain a 
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
and it was from this judgment that the appeal was 
taken. The appellate court felt that the facts of the 
case presented a jury question which, if true, would 
have constituted an infringement upon plaintiff's right8. 
The case was sent back with instructions to the trial 
court to pass upon the motion for a new trial which 
had been filed but never passed upon. 
The case of Bradford v. Magana (La., 1942), 6 
So. (2) 162, apparently deals with some type of flop-
house and not in point here. 
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For these reasons, the judgment in favor of the 
respondent should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM S. FRANK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
mnd Respondent 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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